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The Closing of the Judicial Mind
A review of Unrestrained: Judicial Excess and the Mind of the American Lawyer, by Robert F. Nagel
and How Judges Think, by Richard A. Posner

Complaints about out of control judges are not new. In 1788, in a newspaper
column opposing the proposed new Constitution, a writer with the pen name
Brutus charged that
those who are to be vested with [the judicial power], are to be placed in
a situation altogether unprecedented in a free country. They are to be
rendered totally independent, both of the people and of the
legislature.... [I]n their decisions they will not confine themselves to any
fixed or established rules.... This power in the judicial, will enable them
to mould the government into almost any shape they please.

By David F.
Forte
Posted August
11, 2009
This article
appeared in the
Summer 2009
issue of the
Claremont
Review of Books.
Click here to
send a comment.

Brutus's denunciation of an unrestrained federal judiciary prompted
Alexander Hamilton to reply in The Federalist, emphasizing the judiciary's
structural weakness. In the Constitution's tripartite division of powers,
Hamilton ascribed "FORCE" to the executive, "WILL" to the legislature, and mere
"JUDGMENT" to the judiciary. The Supreme Court was made largely independent of external
checks (something that the Anti-Federalists perceptively noted) partly to be itself an effective
check on the legislative department. But contrary to Brutus's exaggerated fears, Hamilton argued,
the judges would be hemmed in by internal constraints, derived from the function of the office
itself. Because judges spend their lives studying law, not the desires or interests of constituents,
they would possess public virtue sufficient for the people to trust them, and to rely on them to
check legislative will.

In their new books, two highly regarded commentators have sought to explain how and why
judges act as they do. Both analyses are at odds with Hamilton's. Robert F. Nagel, a professor of
constitutional law at the University of Colorado at Boulder, has long worried about the Court's
coarsening effect on American moral and civic character. He sees a Court that has abused judicial
review and overawed federalism and the democratic process. But it did not have to be so. In
Unrestrained: Judicial Excess and the Mind of the American Lawyer, Nagel holds that the
framers did indeed place external checks on the judiciary, showing that they were not sanguine
about the possibility of judicial self-restraint. Judge Richard A. Posner, one of the most influential
pragmatic legal theorists and a founder of the law and economics movement, thinks that Hamilton
simply missed the point. In How Judges Think, Posner argues that judges, particularly Supreme
Court justices, are and always have been legislators, and that this is not a bad thing, so long as
they legislate for practical objectives and do so reasonably in light of their positions and the
particular circumstances of the case. Neither speaks, as Hamilton's generation would have, in
terms of virtue. But Nagel's analysis is, in fact, an explanation of why judges no longer practice
the restrained virtue the framers trusted they would. Posner would locate virtue not in the office,
but in the judge's personal temperament.
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***
Nagel nicely confronts the conservatives' perplexity regarding why, despite the overwhelming
number of appointments by Republican presidents, the Supreme Court remains skeptical of the
Constitution's structures and eager to revise America's social ethos. He rejects the usual
explanations offered by conservatives as either wrong or overly reductionist: the David Souter
excuse (the Republicans didn't know enough about what he really thought), the Anthony Kennedy
complaint (justices socialize and identify with trendy judges worldwide), and the John Paul
Stevens theory (justices follow the tastes of the elite social classes). Nagel also rejects Robert
Bork's own explanation, that the American people like what the Court has done.
Nagel's explanation is that Republican-appointed justices did not "change" at all. Rather, they
were from the start part of an American legal culture that celebrates and propagates the role of the
judge as a leader of moralistic reform. Throughout the book, he gives pointed examples of illogical
Court decisions that have reshaped the country based on nothing more than the judges' personal
views of what is socially beneficial. His analyses of Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) and
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) are particularly withering.
Nagel seems to have accepted as essentially correct the Anti-Federalist position on federal court
power. But he thinks that the federal courts were not a practical danger in the early republic. The
genie did not escape the bottle until federal law and federal jurisdiction expanded in the late 19th
century, followed by the radical restructuring of American legal education in the early 20th
century. That restructuring included the case method (treating what the judges say as oracular),
putting law schools in universities (turning legal education from a practical to an intellectual
pursuit), and the gradual rise of what later came to be called legal realism and the consequent
diminution of legal formalism (thus liberating the judge from important internal restraints).
After World War II, the judiciary's moralistic pretensions were enhanced by a widespread increase
in the use of the injunctive power, allowing courts to become an administrative regulator of
American life. Courts today write opinions in code and indulge myths that their decisions have
brought about inestimable goods, such as an end to segregation. (Nagel points out it was the
Congress—and the states, one might add—that legislated the end of segregation and state
discrimination.) The result has been judicial sovereignty. The Court's actions, Nagel proclaims,
have been a body blow to civic republicanism, eroding the people's self-respect and
self-confidence as political actors.
Nagel ends on a despondent note. He finds that internal restraints, such as personal and
professional modesty, will not work; the legal culture simply overwhelms them. He concludes that
external checks need to be crafted to hold back the judges.
***
Judge Posner has no problem with the legislative character of judging, particularly in the Supreme
Court. As he does in much of his voluminous work, Posner uses a model drawn from economics to
describe the constraints on a judge's decision-making: the judge as labor market participant. Under
that rubric, Posner makes a detailed and informative analysis of both the internal and external
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constraints on the judge. In the end, he finds that most of those restraints are relatively weak, and
he relies primarily on the judge's character to keep him playing by "the rules of the game."
In surveying the literature, Posner articulates nine theories of judicial behavior: attitudinal,
strategic, sociological, psychological, economic, organizational, pragmatic, phenomenological, and
legalist. He says each has limited merit, and then puts them all into one "eclectic" stew that comes
out tasting like pragmatic efficiency, the central theme of much of his jurisprudential analysis. "A
pragmatic judge assesses the consequences of judicial decisions for their bearing on sound public
policy as he conceives it." A "good" judge, in Posner's eyes, is one who gauges pragmatic
considerations (including constraints on his own behavior) efficiently and elegantly in reaching a
conclusion beneficial to society. What Nagel finds so morally anomalous in modern judicial
behavior, Posner identifies as the norm. But both in this book and elsewhere, Judge Posner does
not shy from vigorous criticism of Court decisions that, to his mind, were quite unpragmatic—for
example, last year's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, which struck down Washington,
D.C.'s ban on handguns.
If Posner ever invoked the language of the classical virtues, he might very well confess that he
wants judges to display the virtue of prudence, but it would be a different kind of prudence from
the virtue Hamilton had in mind. Posner roundly disagrees with those who would make "strict
construction," "originalism," or "textualism" essential components of a prudential decision to
maintain the Constitution of 1787. And he certainly does not think there is a distinction between
judicial judgment and legislative will, except perhaps as a contextual nuance. For Posner, both
branches are engaged in one form or another of legislation. He does concede that "legal" materials
limit a judge's discretion—though in his disparaging description of "legalism," there seem to be
few truly objective constraining standards. That which impels a judge, therefore, to respect legal
materials is not virtue, but simply a pragmatic personal temperament inclined to pay heed to the
decisions of the other political branches.
Through much of the book, Posner seeks to dismiss the legitimacy of many legal standards
currently accepted as informing the conclusions of judges. His targets include "legalism" (which
he defines in extremely narrow and mechanistic fashion), "originalism" (which has little definable
content, he claims), "strict construction" (part of legalism that results in absurd conclusions),
"analogy" (hardly an analytic tool), "rules" (of limited and mostly chimerical use), and
"textualism" (hobbled by neglecting a statute's purpose). He delights in giving a dope-slap to the
academy in a chapter entitled, "Judges are Not Law Professors."
Judge Posner believes a judge should be a "constrained pragmatist." If we look at Posner's actual
decisions, we find a jurist who acutely discerns legislators' collective intent, respects precedent (or
at least the underlying policy instantiated in the precedent), and creates decisions of such clarity
that they (despite himself) form a good legalistic basis for the guidance of other judges. Posner is,
as a judge, admirably humble toward what the other political branches have decided. Recently, in
a discussion with Judge Michael McConnell at the Annual Federalist Society's Lawyers
Convention, Posner said that he had reviewed the 161 federal laws that the Supreme Court had
invalidated since Marbury v. Madison (1803). Except for the law mandating segregation in the
District of Columbia, voided by Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), he declared that he would have upheld
every one of those statutes.
But Judge Posner's theory of "judicial law-making," in the hands of a person with less modest
sensibilities, would produce, and has produced, many of the excesses that Brutus predicted so
many years ago.
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***
Hamilton believed that the office helped inform the judge's virtue. Nagel, in contrast, argues that
the office, created by American legal culture, corrupts the man and makes public virtue
impossible. Nagel would not find the alleged "personal" biases of Sonia Sotomayor, President
Obama's nominee to the Supreme Court, suprising. He would find her attitude a product of the
judicial system itself. Judge Posner comes from the opposite direction. He thinks that only a
virtuous person can be a virtuous judge. For him, the man makes the office; the office does not
make (or unmake) the man.
But in the end, judicial virtue must be the product of both the man and the office. Referring to the
process of judgment, the philosopher Michael Polanyi observed, "The freedom of the subjective
person to do as he pleases is overruled by the freedom of the responsible person to act as he
must." Only when the learned and modest man prudently weighs text, purpose, history, structure,
precedent, and reason, can he exhibit the virtue of a judge. The man magnifies the office, and the
office magnifies the man.
David F. Forte is a professor of law at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law in Cleveland,
Ohio and an acting municipal judge in Lakewood, Ohio.
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